# Whisper NIC: the complete registry record. > Everything a registry is expected to publish, kept current: the resources, the > access endpoints, bring-your-own-domain proof, issuance under your own domain, > the verification recipes, and the transparency-log policy. Conservative in what > we state; clear about what is live versus on its way. Every command below is run against the live service and pasted exactly as it answers. The examples use a live resident, `2a04:2a01:b69a:6717:e3b0:51ff:3bf7:f478`; swap in any agent's `/128` or its name. ## 1. Registry identity and resources The registry is operated by **Whisper Security (viaGraph B.V.)**, Amsterdam, NL, on infrastructure we hold ourselves. No third party sits in the trust path. - **Autonomous system:** `AS219419`, IPv6-only, announced from . - **Agent identity block:** `2a04:2a01::/32` — one `/128` per agent identity, within RIPE allocation `2a04:2a00::/31`. - **Assignment model:** `inet6num`, `AGGREGATED-BY-LIR`, **assignment-size 128** — every agent is a normally-allocated, individually-recorded `/128`. - **Resolver / DNS service:** authoritative `ns1.whisper.online` + `ns2.whisper.online`; the recursive upstream is the unbound resolver at `2a04:2a00::53`. - **Routing posture:** RPKI ROA-covered origin, MANRS-compliant, dual-homed (two independent transits) for redundancy. Every agent record refers up to RIPE's own record for `2a04:2a01::/32`, so the ground under it is independently confirmable. Live counts: . ## 2. Access endpoints All read-only, all keyless. - **RDAP, by address:** `https://rdap.whisper.online/ip/` (RFC 9083) — the canonical machine-readable object. - **RDAP, by domain:** `https://rdap.whisper.online/domain/` (RFC 9082/9083) — the served-zone object, with `secureDNS` and the parent referral. - **WHOIS:** `whois.whisper.online`, port 43 (RFC 3912) — the same record in `inet6num` form. - **Finger, by identity:** `finger.whisper.online`, port 79 (RFC 1288) — the same record in plain-text identity form, answerable by a `/128` or an agent FQDN. - **FTP archive, anonymous:** `ftp.whisper.online`, port 21 (RFC 959) — anonymous read-only archive of the NIC registry documents (the same content served over RDAP / WHOIS / HTTP). - **DNSSEC trust anchors:** the served zones are signed and chained; the parent carries a `DS` for `agents.whisper.online` and `whisper.online` (ECDSA P-256, algorithm 13). - **Keyless verification:** `https://rdap.whisper.online/verify-identity/` — one call that checks the whole chain and returns a plain verdict. Confirm the DNSSEC trust anchors yourself (the `DS` values rotate with the keys, so read your own live answer): ```sh $ dig +short DS agents.whisper.online @1.1.1.1 54705 13 2 99B88E7C1FD2A815F3DA0374D9FED2C4735F7EFDDB864CB1A79F9D55 43DFE06D $ dig +short DS whisper.online @1.1.1.1 50855 13 2 3B33E9998425C1F43FCC3B8D4696DB587DB7CEA3F2A235E1556C4C4F 47E247D3 ``` Add `+dnssec` to any forward query and require the `ad` flag (validated). ## 3. Verify any identity with stock tools Eight independent checks, each run against the live service and pasted verbatim. ```sh # 1. Reverse DNS names the address (signed): $ dig -x 2a04:2a01:b69a:6717:e3b0:51ff:3bf7:f478 +short ae3b051ff3bf7f478.tdc38e7c55bad3306a92b830f9bb1e4f9.agents.whisper.online # 2. The forward name points back to the same address (the loop closes): $ dig +short AAAA ae3b051ff3bf7f478.tdc38e7c55bad3306a92b830f9bb1e4f9.agents.whisper.online 2a04:2a01:b69a:6717:e3b0:51ff:3bf7:f478 # 3. The agent's key is pinned in DNS itself (DANE-EE 3 1 1, no CA in the path): $ dig +short TLSA _443._tcp.ae3b051ff3bf7f478.tdc38e7c55bad3306a92b830f9bb1e4f9.agents.whisper.online 3 1 1 9EC1EF18A1F15E5480A0FC3C8D6E9690B2CCF1A7FA7146201940F28C 422BB47D # 4. The TLS leaf on the wire matches that pin (a DANE-aware client validates it): $ openssl s_client -dane_tlsa_domain ae3b051ff3bf7f478.tdc38e7c55bad3306a92b830f9bb1e4f9.agents.whisper.online \ -dane_tlsa_rrdata "3 1 1 9EC1EF18A1F15E5480A0FC3C8D6E9690B2CCF1A7FA7146201940F28C 422BB47D" \ -connect [2a04:2a01:b69a:6717:e3b0:51ff:3bf7:f478]:443 /dev/null | grep "DANE TLSA" # -> DANE TLSA 3 1 1 ... matched EE certificate # 5. One keyless call checks the whole chain and returns a plain verdict: $ curl -s https://rdap.whisper.online/verify-identity/2a04:2a01:b69a:6717:e3b0:51ff:3bf7:f478 | jq '{is_whisper_agent,dane_ok,jws_ok}' # -> {"is_whisper_agent": true, "dane_ok": true, "jws_ok": true} # 6. The registry knows it by address and by name (RDAP canonical; WHOIS mirrors): $ curl -s https://rdap.whisper.online/ip/2a04:2a01:b69a:6717:e3b0:51ff:3bf7:f478 | jq -r .name scout $ whois -h whois.whisper.online 2a04:2a01:b69a:6717:e3b0:51ff:3bf7:f478 # -> inet6num / netname / origin AS219419 / aggregate 2a04:2a01::/32 / ... $ curl -s https://rdap.whisper.online/domain/ae3b051ff3bf7f478.tdc38e7c55bad3306a92b830f9bb1e4f9.agents.whisper.online # -> the signed-DNS / referral view of the same identity # 7. The signed identity document and the did:web record live at the agent's name # (DANE-anchored, so fetch with a DANE-aware client; step 5 verifies the JWS for you): $ curl -s https://ae3b051ff3bf7f478.tdc38e7c55bad3306a92b830f9bb1e4f9.agents.whisper.online/.well-known/whisper-identity # signed JWS identity statement $ curl -s https://ae3b051ff3bf7f478.tdc38e7c55bad3306a92b830f9bb1e4f9.agents.whisper.online/did.json # W3C did:web document (same key) # 8. The agent's SSH host-key fingerprint is in DNS too (SSHFP): $ dig +short SSHFP ae3b051ff3bf7f478.tdc38e7c55bad3306a92b830f9bb1e4f9.agents.whisper.online 3 2 9335418b3b03a5180ada334724917ca2a5d529066305f8a404a139f6 fa1370c8 ``` The agent's certificate is anchored by the TLSA record in signed DNS, **not** by a public CA, so a plain `curl` that only trusts public CAs will reject it — that is the point. Use a DANE-aware client, or the keyless gateway check in step 5, which validates the chain for you. Every check depends on signed DNS and your own tools, not on trusting us. ## 4. Bring your own domain — onboarding and proof (coming) You can put the registry under a domain you already own. You bring the domain; we run the network and the registry that vouch for the identities inside it. Publish the delegation and the DS at your parent (apex or a subdomain): ``` example.com. NS ns1.whisper.online. example.com. NS ns2.whisper.online. example.com. DS ``` **Proof = delegation + DS, observed live in the wild. No TXT challenge.** We poll your own authoritative servers, then public resolvers from several vantage points, until the delegation and a matching `DS` are seen. Verification is **fail-closed**: an unproven domain is never authorized. A daily continuity sweep re-checks every delegated domain; if the chain moves away from us, the domain goes out of order on its own. Keep your zone signed end to end; add no glue for our out-of-bailiwick nameservers. This onboarding flow is being rolled out under this campaign; until it lands for your account, your agents live under `agents.whisper.online`. ## 5. Issuance under a custom domain (coming) Once a domain is onboarded and proven, new agents are minted directly under it, as `a.`, instead of under `agents.whisper.online`. The whole record — reverse DNS, RDAP, WHOIS, DANE, and the signed identity document — follows the name into your domain. - **DANE-EE trust by your DNS:** each agent's per-agent leaf has a `TLSA` record under your now-signed zone; because your zone chains to the public root through your own `DS`, a DANE-aware peer trusts the agent with no Whisper CA and no public CA. - **Coexistence:** identities already issued under `agents.whisper.online` keep resolving for good; the custom domain takes over only for new mints. The IPv6 `/128` stays ours (AS219419, `2a04:2a01::/32`) — only the name moves. - **Capacity:** a configurable per-operator cap keeps signing and replication load bounded, failing closed with a clear message rather than a surprise. The multi-zone serving engine that makes this possible is live; the per-account onboarding and full RDAP/WHOIS/reverse coverage for custom domains are rolling out under this campaign. ## 6. The transparency log Each identity carries an append-only, hash-chained record of its events — issuance, rotation, revocation — signed by a dedicated log key with a published key id. You can read it today, per `/128`: ```sh $ curl -s https://rdap.whisper.online/ip/2a04:2a01:b69a:6717:e3b0:51ff:3bf7:f478/transparency | jq '{count,root_hash,root_signature_alg}' # -> {"count": 1, "root_hash": "...", "root_signature_alg": "ES256"} ``` A revocation cannot be quietly erased from an identity's history. As of the transparency-log rollout (live since `0.112.0`), this per-identity feed is anchored in a single append-only **Merkle log of all identity commitments**, with the public proof surface below. ### The public proof surface (live) The whole log is published, keyless, on the same gateway: - **Signed checkpoint:** `GET https://rdap.whisper.online/checkpoint` — the C2SP signed note (origin `whisper.online/ledger`, `tree_size`, base64 root, Ed25519 signature line). - **Published log key:** `GET https://rdap.whisper.online/checkpoint/key` — key id `8a3a5df0`, the Ed25519 public key and its SPKI form. - **Merkle tiles:** `GET https://rdap.whisper.online/tile//` — the immutable raw 32-byte node hashes. - **Consistency proof:** `GET https://rdap.whisper.online/consistency?from=&to=` — the append-only-extension proof (tree `a` is a prefix of tree `b`). - **Inclusion (per identity):** `GET https://rdap.whisper.online/ip//transparency` now carries a `ledger` arm: `{tree_size, checkpoint, leaves:[{index, leaf_hash, inclusion_proof[]}]}` — opaque commitments only. ```sh # The published key + the signed checkpoint (the checkpoint Link header points at the key): $ curl -s https://rdap.whisper.online/checkpoint/key # -> {"object":"whisper-ledger-key","origin":"whisper.online/ledger","alg":"Ed25519", # "key_id":"8a3a5df0","public_key":"pyTBKL3bSJO7kBbdw4FqJsjREW23jNP07HybKByIabg="} $ curl -s https://rdap.whisper.online/checkpoint # -> whisper.online/ledger # 1 # Ux6ZqO3+QDdWjTWSnyLJAeAu0WlkD70+AcJWSuJURIM= # # — whisper.online/ledger ijpd8L311mCaWM1DkXyS8P0NgPH5F+YZmftiifaUoYbMq680avzBKRe6wI1yCNTakRWvK8ha1C5d6OaPXLoO43Vn3Qg= ``` The signature line is `— `; its first four bytes are the key id `8a3a5df0`, re-derivable as `SHA-256(origin || 0x0A || 0x01 || pubkey)[:4]` — so the signing key is the one at `/checkpoint/key`, nothing to trust in between. ### A worked example, from the tree `ae3b051ff3bf7f478.tdc38e7c55bad3306a92b830f9bb1e4f9.agents.whisper.online` at `2a04:2a01:b69a:6717:e3b0:51ff:3bf7:f478` is a real resident, at **leaf index 0**. The tree currently holds a single leaf, so the inclusion proof is empty and the leaf hash is the root: ```sh $ curl -s https://rdap.whisper.online/ip/2a04:2a01:b69a:6717:e3b0:51ff:3bf7:f478/transparency | jq '.ledger' # -> { # "object": "ledger-inclusion", "origin": "whisper.online/ledger", "tree_size": 1, # "leaves": [{"index": 0, # "leaf_hash": "531e99a8edfe4037568d35929f22c901e02ed169640fbd3e01c2564ae2544483", # "inclusion_proof": []}] # } ``` Identities minted before the log do not yet carry a leaf — their `ledger.leaves` is `[]` until a genesis back-fill folds them in. An empty `leaves` means "no Merkle leaf yet," not "not an agent"; the per-`/128` hash-chained feed still covers them. ### Verify it yourself, with stock tools The leaf commitment is `sha256(salt || event)`; the Merkle leaf is `sha256(0x00 || commitment)`; interior nodes are `sha256(0x01 || left || right)`. Fold the published `inclusion_proof` to the checkpoint root, then verify the Ed25519 signature with the published key. For the single-leaf tree the proof is empty, so the check reduces to "leaf == root" — which the published bytes prove outright: ```sh # 1. the published Merkle leaf hash for index 0 (the tile IS the 32-byte leaf): $ curl -s https://rdap.whisper.online/tile/0/0 | sha256sum $ curl -s https://rdap.whisper.online/tile/0/0 | xxd -p -c64 # -> 531e99a8edfe4037568d35929f22c901e02ed169640fbd3e01c2564ae2544483 # 2. the root in the signed checkpoint (base64 line 3), decoded to hex: $ curl -s https://rdap.whisper.online/checkpoint | sed -n '3p' | base64 -d | xxd -p -c64 # -> 531e99a8edfe4037568d35929f22c901e02ed169640fbd3e01c2564ae2544483 # 3. empty inclusion_proof => leaf == root: the two hex strings match. Done. # For a multi-leaf tree, fold each proof step (node = sha256(0x01 || left || right)) # up to the checkpoint root, then verify the Ed25519 signature with /checkpoint/key. ``` Or one command with the keyless CLI verifier (same stock crypto — Ed25519 + SHA-256 + RFC 6962 folding): ```sh $ whisper ledger checkpoint # fetch + verify the signed checkpoint # -> whisper: checkpoint VERIFIED — signed tree of 1 leaves $ whisper ledger verify 2a04:2a01:b69a:6717:e3b0:51ff:3bf7:f478 --salt --event-file event.bin # -> whisper: VERIFIED — the disclosed commitment is in the signed ledger at leaf 0 of 1 ``` **The claim.** This is a **tamper-evident, signed transparency log**: every checkpoint is signed, openly published, and Bitcoin-anchored, so anyone can verify the proofs today. Want it verifiable without taking our word for it? **Run a witness and we'll cosign back** — independent co-signers make the log mutually, independently verifiable, and the invitation is open: every witness strengthens everyone's proofs. Verification is by **selective disclosure** — the tree holds only opaque salted commitments, so the public proofs show that a commitment is in the signed tree, not what it attests. See the policy () and the witness-policy ADR (). - **Live today:** the per-`/128` signed event feed at `/ip//transparency` (now with a `ledger` inclusion arm), the signed `/checkpoint` and its published key (id `8a3a5df0`), the immutable `/tile//` Merkle tiles, the `/consistency` append-only proof, and the keyless `whisper ledger` verifier — all stock crypto, no SDK. - **An open invitation:** **independent witnesses are welcome** — run one against the checkpoints and we'll cosign back, so the log is mutually, independently verifiable for everyone who takes part (ADR 0018, #151 WB4). The genesis back-fill that folds pre-log identities into the tree is also in flight. ## 7. Policies, sources, and contact - **Registry rulebook:** policy (), naming (), reserved & premium names (), statistics (), data licence (). - **Open decisions (ADRs):** transparency-log witness policy (); full set (). - **Network and company:** AS219419 (), Whisper Security (), the home for your agents (). - **Abuse / contact:** . --- - **Overview:** - **Bring your agent home:** - **Verify an agent (the living nest):** © viaGraph B.V. (dba Whisper Security)